Jonathan Freedland: Burnham honeymoon collides with Trump volatility
Downing Street pursues access through Steve Witkoff channel, UK influence shrinks when even US insiders claim they cannot steer him
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theguardian.com
Jonathan Freedland
theguardian.com
Andy Burnham’s first days as UK prime minister have produced the kind of early polling that turns a leadership change into a honeymoon. Jonathan Freedland writes in The Guardian that an initial survey put Burnham’s net approval up sharply, with gains across most voter groups, and a communication style built around unscripted speeches and quick social-media reflexes.
The problem, Freedland argues, is that the next test is not domestic presentation but exposure to Washington. He describes Donald Trump as the looming variable over Burnham’s premiership: erratic, impatient, and prone to policy-by-announcement. The recent example Freedland cites is Trump’s claimed “breakthrough” on Gaza—an assertion that Hamas was ready to disarm in return for an Israeli withdrawal—met with skepticism on the ground and caution from Palestinians. In Freedland’s telling, the gap between the White House microphone and the region’s realities is not a communications issue; it is the operating environment.
British officials, he reports, are trying to manage that environment through access. The UK national security adviser, Jonathan Powell, is said to be in regular contact with Trump’s personal envoy and golfing associate Steve Witkoff. But Freedland notes that access is not the same as leverage, and he relays the claim that even senior US administration officials privately concede they have limited influence over Trump’s decisions. That leaves London with a familiar set of options: flatter, confront, or reduce dependency.
Freedland’s proposed answer is less about personal diplomacy than about insulation. He suggests Burnham should minimise the number of decisions that hinge on Trump’s attention span—by seeking “safety in numbers” with European neighbours and building policy that can survive abrupt shifts in US posture. The subtext is a post-Brexit constraint: Britain wants the collective weight of Europe without the institutional membership that would make alignment automatic. In practice, that means more ad-hoc coordination, more reliance on informal channels, and a constant attempt to keep trade, security and energy questions from being decided by the next Oval Office impulse.
The article also points to a recent precedent: Freedland writes that Keir Starmer’s earlier economic momentum was knocked off course when Trump combined with Israel in an attack on Iran, a reminder that foreign-policy shocks travel quickly into domestic budgets. A prime minister can run a tight message operation at home, but fuel prices, shipping risks and investment delays do not wait for Downing Street to find the right tone.
Burnham’s advantage, Freedland suggests, is that his political style already leans toward candour and breaking with inherited orthodoxies. His weakness is that the most expensive orthodoxies are often the ones enforced from abroad.
Powell may have Witkoff on speed dial. Freedland’s reporting implies that the person with the final say may still be the one least inclined to pick up the phone.