Spyware boss ties Predator hacks to Greek state

A Greek court in February sentenced Intellexa founder Tal Dilian to eight years in prison for illegally obtaining personal data linked to the “Greek Watergate” wiretapping scandal. This week, Dilian told Reuters he would not be a “scapegoat” and implied Greece’s government was behind dozens of phone hacks carried out with Predator spyware, according to TechCrunch.

Predator is not a consumer product that accidentally ends up in the wrong hands. It is built to break into iPhones and Android devices, pull messages, call logs, emails and location data, and do it quietly—often through a link that looks like ordinary content. Dilian’s claim that such tools are “typically sold only to governments” matters less as a defense than as a description of how the market works: the customer wants capabilities that are difficult to obtain under normal legal process, and the vendor sells a package that reduces paperwork, friction and traceability.

That is why this industry prefers the grey zone. A ministry that buys an off-the-shelf lawful intercept system inherits audit trails, procurement records and a chain of responsibility. A ministry that can route surveillance through a contractor gets deniability, looser logging, and a ready-made explanation when targets include journalists or political rivals. When scandals erupt, resignations land on intelligence chiefs and aides, while the technical operator points to “end users” and the political leadership points to a private supplier.

Greece has already lived the second-order effects. After revelations that phones belonging to journalists, opposition figures, ministers and military officials had been targeted, senior officials resigned, including the head of the national intelligence agency and a senior aide to Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis, TechCrunch notes. Yet no government officials have been convicted. The result is a familiar equilibrium: a state that gains reach, a vendor that gains revenue, and a public inquiry that struggles to pin down who ordered what.

Dilian now says he is willing to share evidence with national and international regulators. That offer reads less like transparency than leverage. A spyware vendor’s most valuable asset is not code; it is the record of who bought access, who requested targets, and what was collected. Once a supplier is facing prison time and sanctions—as Dilian is, after the U.S. sanctioned him in 2024 over Predator’s use against U.S. officials and journalists—the incentives shift from silence to bargaining.

The scandal began as a story about a private company selling a dangerous tool. It is ending as a story about what governments purchase when they pay for plausible deniability.

Dilian says he will appeal, and says his conviction “without evidence” could itself be part of a cover-up. Greece’s political system is now waiting to see whether a convicted spyware executive decides to start naming clients.