US House stalls ADS-B In cockpit mandate after DC crash
NTSB-backed ROTOR Act fails by one vote as GOP pushes controller-led alternative, Retrofit costs and military opt-outs drive the gap
Images
A bipartisan US House bill to mandate an additional anti-collision capability in airline cockpits failed by a single vote, leaving aviation safety advocates and victims’ families accusing lawmakers of blocking a fix after a deadly Washington-area crash. The ROTOR Act would have required “ADS-B In,” a system that displays nearby air traffic in the cockpit, and would have pushed certain military aircraft to broadcast their positions in civilian airspace. Business Insider reports the bill had passed the Senate and was backed by the National Transportation Safety Board, airlines, and pilot and flight attendant unions.
The push follows the January 2025 midair collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport between an American Airlines jet and an Army helicopter that killed 67 people. Commercial aircraft have been required since 2020 to carry “ADS-B Out,” which broadcasts position data to air traffic control. ADS-B In is the complementary capability that lets pilots see surrounding traffic on cockpit displays—effectively turning aircraft from passive transmitters into active receivers.
Supporters argue that the missing piece is time. Aviation safety expert Kivanc Avrenli told Business Insider that ADS-B In could have given the airliner’s pilots nearly a minute more to react, compared with the 19 seconds they had before impact using existing collision-warning logic. In dense mixed-use airspace, that margin is the difference between having options and having none.
Opponents of the ROTOR Act cited cost and security concerns, including objections to broadcasting aircraft positions and the expense of retrofitting fleets. Those objections are now being channelled into an alternative Republican proposal, the ALERT Act, which would keep collision alerting primarily with air traffic controllers and would allow some military flights to opt out of transmitting their positions.
The fight is less about whether the technology exists than about who pays and who is accountable when it does not. ADS-B In imposes a clear, auditable requirement on operators: equip aircraft, maintain the display, train crews, and bear the retrofit bill. Leaving the burden with air traffic control preserves a system where risk is socialised through staffing and infrastructure budgets, while individual operators can argue they complied with existing rules.
The military carve-outs highlight the same dynamic. Civilian airspace is shared, but the costs of transparency fall unevenly: commercial carriers face consumer and regulator scrutiny when things go wrong, while defence aviation can argue operational security. The result is a safety regime that tightens after catastrophe, then reopens exceptions when the bill arrives.
The ROTOR Act’s defeat leaves advocates facing a new legislative path while the airspace around Washington continues to mix heavy commercial traffic with military flights under the same human bottlenecks.