China blacklists 20 Japanese entities for dual-use exports

Images

×

IHI's headquarters in Tokyo on Tuesday. Several affiliated companies of the Japanese conglomerate are among firms put on a Chinese blacklist the same day. japantimes.co.jp

A solar farm in Nakai, Kanagawa Prefecture, in March 2016. Japan gets about a tenth of its electricity from solar panels despite having nearly no domestic production of photovoltaics (PVs). japantimes.co.jp

Sonic the Hedgehog, Castlevania's Alucard and the weak yet lovable Slime from Dragon Quest are just some of Japan's iconic gaming franchises celebrating midlife anniversaries in 2026. japantimes.co.jp

Japan agency aims for both decarbonization, growth japantimes.co.jp

‹ ›

China’s Commerce Ministry on Tuesday placed 20 Japanese entities on a “dual-use” export blacklist, requiring special permission for shipments and ordering exporters to halt any ongoing transfers. The list includes Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and multiple Mitsubishi Heavy Industries subsidiaries, several IHI-related firms, Japan’s National Defense Academy, and JAXA, Japan’s space agency, according to The Japan Times.

The mechanism is familiar—lists, licences, and compliance checks—but the target selection is the message. Beijing describes the entities as “participating in enhancing Japan’s military capabilities,” and the restrictions cover “dual-use” items: components and materials that can move between civilian industry and defence. That category is broad by design; it turns ordinary supply chains into a permissioned system where the state decides what counts as acceptable end-use.

For Japanese manufacturers, the immediate risk is not only the loss of Chinese inputs, but the uncertainty around what qualifies as “dual-use” and how quickly approvals can be withdrawn. Export control regimes work by forcing private firms to internalise political risk as an operating cost: compliance departments become a production factor, and procurement teams are pushed to build redundancy that looks inefficient on a spreadsheet until a licence is denied.

The move also fits a wider pattern in which major states build parallel trade systems without formally breaking WTO-era language. Instead of tariffs, the leverage comes through administrative choke points: end-user certificates, watch lists, and “special permission” that can be granted selectively. The result is a market where access is conditional and revocable—useful for signalling to domestic audiences, and equally useful for pressuring foreign firms to localise, partner, or shift technology.

Japan has spent years trying to reduce strategic dependence on China in areas from rare earths to batteries and advanced manufacturing. Beijing’s list pressures the same companies that would be central to any re-shoring or defence-industrial expansion in Japan, while also warning universities and research institutions that their international ties are now treated as security liabilities.

The Commerce Ministry’s instruction was blunt: any ongoing exports of covered items must “cease immediately.”