Sweden nears decision on four new air-defense frigates, FMV targets 2030 delivery in SEK 40–60bn procurement, industrial policy and vendor lock-in sail under NATO flags

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Kapplöpning om svenska krigsfartyg – för miljarder svd.se

aftonbladet.se

Sweden is shopping for four new air-defense frigates in a deal that could land somewhere between SEK 40–60 billion—an acquisition so large it inevitably turns into industrial policy with missiles attached.

According to Svenska Dagbladet and TT (as republished by Aftonbladet), the Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) has been working since 2021 to procure “larger surface combatants,” with Defence Minister Pål Jonson saying a decision is hoped for “during the spring.” FMV reportedly wants the first ship delivered by 2030—an ambitious timeline in a sector where schedules are more aspirational than contractual.

The contenders are doing what arms exporters do: bringing steel to Swedish ports as floating brochures. France’s Naval Group showcased its new 122-meter FDI-class frigate Amiral Ronarc’h during a “shakedown” voyage—ostensibly testing systems, but also making a pointed stop in Gothenburg. Spain has been courting Stockholm too, with Navantia promoting a newer “Alfa 4000” concept (not yet an in-service ship), after its NATO flagship Almirante Juan de Borbón visited Stockholm earlier.

The capability pitch is straightforward. Sweden’s current top-end surface combatants, Visby-class corvettes, are about 70 meters long. The new frigates would be larger, stay at sea longer, carry organic area air defense (not just self-defense), and support anti-submarine warfare with an embarked helicopter. Jonson frames the requirement in terms of protecting Sweden against cruise missiles and ballistic threats.

The more interesting story is incentives. A defence procurement of this magnitude is not just a purchase; it’s a 30-year dependency contract. Whoever wins doesn’t merely deliver hulls—they sell training pipelines, software updates, spares, integration work, mid-life upgrades, and the quiet privilege of being the only entity that can certify fixes when something breaks at the worst possible time.

Johan Granlund at the Swedish Defence University tells TT the platforms are broadly comparable in size and capability, and that the real differentiator is maturity: the French offer is already built, the British option is nearing launch of its first vessel, while the Spanish alternative remains largely design-stage. In a rational market, that would matter: prototypes cost more, slip more, and invite “requirements growth.” In a political market, maturity competes with other currencies—alliances, offsets, domestic jobs, and the irresistible temptation to treat a naval program as regional development.

The state’s problem is classic: politicians want “capability” plus constituency-friendly industrial footprints; vendors want lifetime revenue streams; the armed forces want something that works on time. The taxpayer gets to fund everyone’s incentives—whether or not the ships arrive when promised, and whether or not the fleet ends up locked into a single foreign supply chain for decades.