Iran’s splinternet makes shutdowns cheaper and censorship more exportable

Iran’s January internet blackout offered a preview of the internet’s next phase: not a global network with occasional censorship, but a patchwork of national intranets where governments can selectively switch off reality. The Guardian reports that during the shutdown Iranians retained access to a state-curated “internet-like” environment—government-monitored messaging, domestic video platforms, state news, local navigation—while losing access to international reporting and the ability to transmit evidence of state violence abroad.

This is the splinternet as policy instrument. It is not simply blocking websites; it is controlling routing and choke points so that information flows become a sovereign resource. The Guardian notes that for years US-backed “internet freedom” programs tried to make full shutdowns costly and difficult, in part by funding circumvention tools. Those efforts are now being cut or redirected, while censorship and traffic-management technologies are improving and being exported.

Iran’s model matters because it demonstrates feasibility. The internet was designed to be decentralized and resilient, but states have learned to re-centralize it through domestic gateways, deep packet inspection, and licensing regimes. The Guardian describes Chinese-made systems sold to governments—Pakistan, Myanmar, Ethiopia among them—that enable fine-grained control over what enters and leaves a country. Iran is believed to rely on similar tooling.

Markets, predictably, respond by routing around the state—at a price. Zero Hedge reports that Starlink terminals and connectivity in Iran have developed into a black market with soaring prices as war risks rise. Whether one trusts Zero Hedge’s tone is optional; the underlying dynamic is not: when governments ration communications, entrepreneurs create parallel supply chains.

The result is a communications arms race where censorship becomes a procurement category and connectivity becomes contraband. Authoritarians want shutdowns because they reduce scrutiny precisely when repression peaks. But shutdowns also damage commerce, payments, and logistics—costs regimes increasingly try to externalize onto citizens and private firms.

For the rest of the region, this is grimly transferable. Once the tooling exists, “temporary” shutdowns become a standard response to protest, war scares, or political embarrassment. And once citizens learn to treat connectivity like a scarce commodity—something you buy on the black market, hide from police, and share through trusted networks—states get what they say they want: fewer facts, more rumors, and a population forced into informality.

The splinternet isn’t the future; it’s a product already shipping.