US military buildup around Iran reaches post-2003 scale

Images

×

People walk past an anti-U.S. billboard in Tehran on Jan. 26. japantimes.co.jp

A solar farm in Nakai, Kanagawa Prefecture, in March 2016. Japan gets about a tenth of its electricity from solar panels despite having nearly no domestic production of photovoltaics (PVs). japantimes.co.jp

Sonic the Hedgehog, Castlevania's Alucard and the weak yet lovable Slime from Dragon Quest are just some of Japan's iconic gaming franchises celebrating midlife anniversaries in 2026. japantimes.co.jp

Japan agency aims for both decarbonization, growth japantimes.co.jp

US ramps up military buildup in Middle East amid talks with Iran france24.com

‹ ›

The US is assembling one of its largest Middle East force packages since the 2003 Iraq invasion even as the White House insists it still prefers a negotiated outcome with Iran over Tehran’s nuclear program. That combination—maximal logistics plus performative diplomacy—is not a contradiction so much as a mechanism: once the machinery for a strike is in place, restraint becomes harder to sell at home and to allies.

According to Reuters (via the Japan Times), officials and diplomats across the Gulf and Europe now see Washington and Tehran sliding toward conflict as the military buildup eclipses talks. Gulf states that have spent years threading the needle between US security guarantees and economic links to Iran are reportedly treating a clash as more likely than a settlement. Israel, Reuters adds, is preparing for possible joint action with the US, though no final decision has been made.

France 24 similarly describes a rapid US buildup “amid talks,” a framing that understates the real point of surge deployments: they are less about battlefield necessity than about creating a credible commitment. A carrier strike group, forward-deployed fighters, air defense units, and the supply chain to sustain them are not just capabilities; they are political sunk costs. Once deployed, they generate their own constituency—commanders who want options, allies who want reassurance, and domestic hawks who treat any pause as weakness.

Precision strikes are sold as contained, rational, and reversible. But building the infrastructure for them is the opposite: it reduces the space for reversal. The more the US pre-positions assets, the more any failure to use them looks like a bluff—especially if Israel is publicly signaling readiness and Iran is signaling defiance.

The spillover is already visible in commercial risk pricing. Even without a shot fired, the probability of disruption around the Strait of Hormuz—through which a large share of seaborne oil transits—pushes up war-risk premiums, rerouting costs, and tanker rates. When states “signal resolve,” households pay the premium at the pump and in freight costs, while insurers and shipowners invoice the geopolitical theater.

Iran’s likely response set is also well understood: direct missile or drone strikes on regional bases, harassment of shipping, and proxy escalation. Reuters notes that regional actors are preparing accordingly. The result is an escalation ladder with many rungs and few off-ramps, built less by Iranian centrifuges than by the bureaucratic logic of pre-commitment.

Washington is constructing the logistical reality of war while maintaining the rhetorical fiction of patience. If diplomacy fails, it will not be because the US lacked leverage; it will be because leverage was designed to be used.