Paris Agriculture Fair opens without cows over disease fears

The Paris International Agricultural Show has opened without cows for the first time, a decision framed as a disease-prevention measure rather than a logistical mishap. France 24 reports that organisers barred cattle because of “disease fears,” turning what is usually a living showroom for French livestock into a conspicuously de-animalised spectacle.

The problem is not that disease risk is imaginary—livestock exhibitions are, by design, high-contact mixing events that can amplify respiratory and enteric pathogens. The problem is that the public justification tends to be all hazard and no model: which pathogen, what transmission route, what baseline prevalence, what expected harm, and what marginal risk reduction does a blanket cattle ban buy compared with targeted controls?

A real risk assessment would specify at least three layers. First, the hazard list: e.g., bovine respiratory disease complexes, foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) in the nightmare scenario, bovine tuberculosis in a slower-burn scenario, or even zoonotic influenza concerns depending on circulating strains. Second, the exposure pathways: animal-to-animal aerosol spread in enclosed halls; fomite transmission via shared equipment; and human-mediated spread via clothing, boots, vehicles, and feed handling. Third, the probability and consequence estimates: not just “it could happen,” but expected outbreak size under alternative mitigations.

Without those inputs, “no cows” risks becoming biosecurity theatre—highly visible restriction that signals seriousness while leaving the audience unable to evaluate proportionality. If the feared pathway is visitors carrying pathogens between farms, banning cattle at the fair addresses the symptom (animals in the hall) rather than the vector (human traffic). Conversely, if the specific concern is cattle-to-cattle amplification of a circulating disease, then the ban might be rational—but that case should be made with surveillance data and a transparent threshold.

There is also a political economy angle: large fairs are reputational infrastructure. When a state-linked or state-blessed event opts for a maximal restriction, it implicitly sets a norm that smaller private events may be pressured to follow—often without the resources to implement nuanced controls. The result is a one-size-fits-all precaution regime that rewards compliance signalling over measurement.

A more evidence-based approach would publish the assumptions: current veterinary surveillance findings, the estimated reproduction number (R) for the relevant pathogen in exhibition conditions, and the expected reduction from specific mitigations (vaccination requirements where applicable, pre-entry testing, ventilation standards, separation of herds, controlled contact protocols, and post-event tracing). If the numbers still justify a ban, fine. If not, the public deserves to know that the policy is primarily about avoiding blame rather than managing quantifiable risk.

Source: France 24.