Sweden approves SEK 12.9bn Ukraine military package focused on air defence and long-range drones

Sweden is sending a new military support package to Ukraine worth SEK 12.9 billion, with a heavy emphasis on air defence, long-range strike capabilities, and ammunition—another large transfer of taxpayer resources executed at political speed, with the usual promise that oversight will be handled by the same people who approved the rush.

Sydsvenskan reports that the package is Sweden’s 21st since Russia’s full-scale invasion and brings total Swedish military support to roughly SEK 103 billion. Defence Minister Pål Jonson framed the timing as critical, citing Russia’s increased use of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and long-range drones.

Of the SEK 12.9 billion, Sydsvenskan says SEK 4.3 billion will go to procure air-defence systems including Tridon Mk2—truck-mounted—and RBS 70 mounted on armoured vehicles. Together with a January package, Sweden claims Ukraine will have received equipment for three air-defence battalions.

Another SEK 5.6 billion is earmarked for Ukraine’s domestic development and production of long-range missiles and drones. SEK 3 billion is allocated to anti-tank weapons and ammunition taken from Swedish stocks, purchases of artillery shells, spare parts, and training.

Delivery timelines range from immediate to up to two years, according to the report—an awkward detail for a package sold as urgent. The package pairs a large headline figure with procurement, production capacity, and logistics constraints that can push deliveries into later years.

The context is also shifting. Jonson pointed to a sharp reduction in US support under President Trump. Sydsvenskan cites Atlantic Council figures placing the US military support budget for Ukraine this year at $400 million (about SEK 3.6 billion), down from $14 billion in 2024. A growing share of “US weapons for Ukraine” is now Europe buying American kit for onward delivery—a neat way to keep Washington’s industrial base warm while European taxpayers pick up the bill.

For Sweden, the package is simultaneously foreign policy, defence policy, and industrial policy. Systems like Tridon Mk2 and RBS 70 are not abstract line items; they are products, supply chains, and contracts. The democratic-control question is therefore not merely whether Sweden “supports Ukraine,” but how procurement decisions are made under accelerated mandates: who chooses which systems, through which contracting paths, and with what transparency when urgency is the all-purpose justification.

War funding can reduce scrutiny: secrecy increases, timelines compress, and political consensus can treat questions as disloyalty. The package also raises questions about accountability at home when billions are allocated for weapons and delivery schedules can drift into the next fiscal year.